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Winning the War on Drug Prices: 
Analyzing Reverse Payment Settlements 
Through the Lens of Trinko 
Alicia I. Hogges-Thomas* 
As drug prices continue to rise, many Americans are forced to choose between buying 
food or medicine. In 1984, Congress sought to address this issue by enacting the Hatch-
Waxman Act. The purpose of the Act was to increase the availability of generic drugs by 
enabling the generic companies to challenge the brand companies’ patents in litigation. 
But this purpose is frustrated when the brand companies pay the generic companies 
millions of dollars to settle the litigation and delay their market entry. These settlements, 
which are usually referred to as “pay-for-delay” or “reverse payment” settlements, benefit 
the pharmaceutical companies at the expense of consumers.  
 
Reverse payment settlements have been challenged under the antitrust laws. In the last 
decade, the circuit courts have developed three approaches to analyzing reverse payment 
settlements. None of the courts considered whether the patent was valid or infringed. 
Furthermore, because courts favor settlement, the prevailing analysis has resulted in 
absolutely no antitrust scrutiny of reverse payment settlements. 
 
Most recently, the Supreme Court granted a petition for certiorari in FTC v. Watson 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. This Article argues that the Court’s decision should be guided by 
the principles in Verizon Communications v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko. Those 
principles will lead the Court to consider the particular circumstances of the 
pharmaceutical industry and how the Hatch-Waxman Act affects competition in that 
industry. After considering these factors, the Court should conclude that the policy 
favoring settlement should not be considered in this antitrust analysis and that the courts 
should decide the merits of the underlying patent claim. 
 
 * Assistant Professor of Law, St. Thomas University School of Law. A.B., Harvard College; 
J.D., Harvard Law School. I would like to thank my family for their never-ending love and support 
while I worked on this Article. 
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Introduction 
For decades, Americans have struggled with the high cost of 
prescription drugs. As prices continue to rise, some consumers forego 
treatment completely. Others split their drugs in half or cross the 
Canadian border in search of lower prices. In 1984, Congress sought to 
remedy this issue by passing the Drug Price Competition and Patent 
Term Restoration Act (the “Hatch-Waxman Act” or the “Act”).1 The 
 
 1. Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984). 
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purpose of the Act was to increase the availability of generic drugs 
through patent litigation. The price of generic drugs is significantly lower 
than the price of brand drugs.2 As a result, when a generic drug enters 
the market, the brand company must lower its price to compete. 
Unfortunately, the pharmaceutical companies are winning the drug 
price war. The Hatch-Waxman Act envisioned a regime wherein generic 
companies would challenge weak patents in litigation and then market 
their drugs after demonstrating that the patent was invalid or not 
infringed. Like many civil actions, these cases often settle. But these 
settlements are unusual in that the brand company pays the generic firm to 
delay its market entry. These payments are called reverse payment 
settlements because the money flows from the patent holder to the alleged 
infringer. In contrast, in an ordinary patent settlement, the payment flows 
from the infringer to the patent holder. By paying the generic company 
for delay, the brand company maintains its monopoly and the resulting 
ability to control prices. The drug companies split the monopoly profits 
of the brand company, which is a winning situation for both companies. 
The losers are the consumers, who continue to pay high prices because 
there is no competition for the drugs they need. According to the Federal 
Trade Commission (“FTC”), reverse payment settlements are costing 
consumers 3.5 billion dollars a year in the form of higher drug prices.3 
Although they have been challenged under the antitrust laws, most 
courts have taken the position that reverse payment settlements are 
essentially immune from antitrust scrutiny, except in very limited 
circumstances. Any potential analysis must consider the fact that one of 
the parties holds a patent. As a result, the settlement will only violate the 
antitrust laws if the patent is invalid or if there is no infringement. If the 
generic drug is infringing a valid patent, the patent holder has a right to 
exclude the generic drug, and thus there is no antitrust violation. 
In the last decade, the circuit courts have created three different 
approaches to analyzing reverse payment settlements. Unfortunately, 
none of these analyses address validity and infringement, the very issues 
that determine whether there is an antitrust violation in the first place. 
The fact that these agreements are litigation settlement agreements 
further complicates the analysis. Historically, courts have favored the 
settlement of litigation, and this policy is the primary justification for 
their reluctance to decide the issues of validity and infringement. 
 
 2. Generic drugs cost 20–90% less than brand drugs. FTC Staff Report Finds 60 Percent Increase 
in Pharmaceutical Industry Deals That Delay Consumers’ Access to Lower-Cost Generic Drugs, Fed. 
Trade Comm’n (May 3, 2011), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2011/05/mmareport.shtm. 
 3. Fed. Trade Comm’n, Pay-for-Delay: How Drug Company Pay-Offs Cost Consumers 
Billions (2010) [hereinafter Fed. Trade Comm’n, Pay-for-Delay]. 
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As the story continues, all eyes are now on the Supreme Court, 
which recently granted a petition for certiorari in FTC v. Watson 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.4 This Article argues that the Supreme Court’s 
decision should be guided by the principles in Verizon Communications 
v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko.5 Those principles will lead the Court 
to consider the particular circumstances of the pharmaceutical industry 
and how the Hatch-Waxman Act affects competition in that industry. In 
doing so, the Court should compare reverse payment settlements to 
ordinary patent settlements and consider whether the Hatch-Waxman 
Act diminishes or increases antitrust harm.6 Based on this industry-
specific approach, the Court should conclude that when analyzing 
antitrust challenges to reverse payment settlements, courts should 
disregard the policy favoring settlement and decide the issues of patent 
validity and infringement. 
I.  The Hatch-Waxman Act 
A. Purpose and Summary 
Under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, pharmaceutical 
companies must file new drug applications (“NDAs”) with the Food and 
Drug Administration (“FDA”) before marketing a new drug to the 
public.7 In 1984, Congress enacted the Hatch-Waxman Act, which 
amended the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act to allow manufacturers of 
bioequivalent generic drugs to file abbreviated new drug applications 
(“ANDAs”)8 relying on the safety and efficacy tests of brand name drug 
manufacturers.9 
When an ANDA is filed, the generic firm must certify, with respect 
to each patent that claims the brand name drug or a use thereof, either  
(I) that [the] patent information has not been filed, (II) that [the] 
patent has expired, (III) . . . the date on which [the] patent will expire, 
or (IV) that [the] patent is invalid or will not be infringed by the 
manufacture, use, or sale of the new drug for which the application is 
submitted.10  
When an ANDA filer certifies under Paragraph IV that the relevant 
patent is invalid or not infringed, it must notify the patent owner and the 
brand name drug manufacturer.11 After the patent owner receives notice, 
 
 4. 677 F.3d 1298 (2012). 
 5. 540 U.S. 398 (2004). 
 6. Id. at 411 (citing Concord v. Boston Edison Co., 915 F.2d 17, 22 (1st Cir. 1990)). 
 7. 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (2012). 
 8. H.R. Rep. No. 98-857(I) (1984); 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(1)–(2). 
 9. H.R. Rep. No. 98-857(I); 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2). 
 10. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii). 
 11. Id. § 355(j)(2)(B)(iii). 
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it has forty-five days to initiate a patent infringement action.12 If a patent 
infringement action is initiated, the FDA will not approve the ANDA for 
thirty months, or until a district court decides that the patent is invalid or 
not infringed, whichever is earlier.13 
The primary purpose of the Hatch-Waxman Act was to increase 
generic drug competition by accelerating entry into the market.14 When it 
files an ANDA, the generic drug company is not required to conduct the 
costly clinical trials that are necessary when filing the entire NDA.15 
Furthermore, if it is proven in litigation that the generic drug does not 
infringe the relevant patent, or that the patent is invalid, the generic drug 
can enter the market before the expiration of the patent term. To 
encourage patent challenges, the Hatch-Waxman Act provides a 180-day 
exclusive marketing period for the first generic company that challenges 
an invalid or non-infringed patent.16 In this way, the Act provides an 
incentive for the testing of potentially weak patents through litigation.17 
The Act also sought to increase innovation by restoring time lost on 
patent life while preparing for and awaiting FDA approval.18 Although 
the statutory patent term in the United States was seventeen years, 
pharmaceutical products were marketed for less time, because the patents 
were obtained before FDA approval was granted.19 To counteract this 
issue and encourage innovation, the legislature included a patent term 
extension for pharmaceuticals undergoing regulatory review.20 
Furthermore, brand name manufacturers received a three-year market 
exclusivity period for new forms and uses of previously approved drugs.21 
Hence, the Hatch-Waxman Act strikes a balance between 
competition and innovation.22 Within this legislation is Congress’ judgment 
on the amount of competition and innovation that serves the public 
interest. 
 
 12. Id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii). 
 13. Id. 
 14. H.R. Rep. No. 98-857(I), at 14. 
 15. Id. 
 16. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv). 
 17. Michael A. Carrier, Unsettling Drug Patent Settlements: A Framework for Presumptive Illegality, 
108 Mich. L. Rev. 37, 61 (2009); see C. Scott Hemphill, Paying for Delay: Pharmaceutical Patent 
Settlement as a Regulatory Design Problem, 81 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1553, 1579 (2006) (noting that the 180-day 
“bounty” can be worth several hundred million dollars, inducing generic companies to challenge brand 
name drug patents). 
 18. H.R. Rep. No. 98-857(I), at 14. 
 19. Id. at 17–18. 
 20. 35 U.S.C. § 156(g)(6) (2012). 
 21. 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3)(E)(iii). 
 22. Carrier, supra note 17, at 45, 62 (arguing that the Hatch-Waxman Act created a “nuanced 
equilibrium between competition and innovation”). 
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B. The Natural By-Product of the Hatch-Waxman Act 
The first generic firm to file a Paragraph IV ANDA (“ANDA-IV”) 
alleging patent invalidity or non-infringement is entitled to 180 days of 
exclusive marketing after the application is approved. Until this 180-day 
period expires, no other ANDA-IVs will be approved.23 But if a 
subsequent ANDA-IV filer demonstrates that the patent is invalid or not 
infringed, the exclusive marketing period of the first ANDA-IV filer is 
triggered, enabling subsequent ANDA-IV filers to enter after the 180-
day period has ended.24 
Despite this fact, subsequent ANDA filers have little, if any, incentive 
to select Paragraph IV and challenge the patent. A generic firm derives a 
significant portion of its profits during the 180-day exclusive marketing 
period.25 Recognizing the value of exclusive marketing, Congress created 
the 180-day period to encourage generic firms to file ANDA-IVs that will 
ultimately challenge brand firm patents in litigation. But if the first 
ANDA-IV filer settles, the 180-day exclusive marketing period is not 
transferred to subsequent ANDA-IV filers, even if they prove lack of 
infringement or invalidity. This non-transferability of the 180-day reward is 
the primary reason why other generic firms will refrain from filing ANDA-
IVs.26 For the few generic firms that believe that filing an ANDA-IV may 
still be profitable without the exclusivity period, the requirement to wait 
180 days to enter the market is an additional deterrent.27 
Thus, when the brand company pays the first ANDA-IV filer to delay 
its entry, it essentially prevents all other generic companies from entering 
the market.28 Given the regulatory structure, a reverse payment settlement 
is the best option for brand companies. The payment preserves the brand 
companies’ monopoly profits, whereas losing the litigation will cost them 
billions of dollars.29 Generic companies also like the arrangement because 
 
 23. Hemphill, supra note 17, at 1578 (noting that the “legal form” of the exclusive period is a 
delay in FDA approval of all other ANDA-IVs); see Carrier, supra note 17, at 47 (noting that the FTC 
cannot approve other ANDAs until the 180-day period expires). 
 24. Hemphill, supra note 17, at 1587. 
 25. Id. at 1590. 
 26. The 2003 Medicare Prescription Drug Improvement and Modernization Act created events 
that would cause a first ANDA-IV filer to lose its 180-day exclusive marketing period. 21 U.S.C. 
§ 355(j)(5)(D). However, it appears that this modification has not reduced the number of reverse 
payment settlements, presumably because the 180-day reward is still not transferred to the next 
ANDA-IV filer. See C. Scott Hemphill, Collusive and Exclusive Settlements of Intellectual Property 
Litigation, 2010 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 685, 708 (2010) (arguing that generic firm challenges are 
promoted by the 180-day period). 
 27. Carrier, supra note 17, at 47 (noting that the FTC cannot approve other ANDAs until the 
180-day period expires). 
 28. Herbert Hovenkamp et al., Anticompetitive Settlement of Intellectual Property Disputes, 
87 Minn. L. Rev. 1719, 1755 (2003) (noting that if the brand firm pays the generic firm to delay entry, 
this postpones the start of the 180-day marketing period, locking other generics out of the market). 
 29. By paying off the generic company, the brand company maintains its monopoly position. As a 
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the payment exceeds the profits they would have earned after winning 
the lawsuit and entering the market.30 
Ironically, the Hatch-Waxman Act itself has provided the foundation 
for reverse payment settlements.31 For this reason, reverse payment 
settlements have been described as the “natural by-product” of the Act’s 
180-day exclusive marketing provision.32 
II.  How Reverse Payment Settlements Harm Consumers 
Reverse payment settlements have affected the prices of various 
popular drugs, such as Cipro and Plavix.33 The drugs at the center of 
these lawsuits are used to treat common illnesses, such as hypertension 
and breast cancer. Others prevent strokes and heart attacks. In addition 
to individual consumers, lawsuits have been filed by wholesale drug 
companies, pharmacies, workers’ unions, and health plans. 
The federal government has taken the position that reverse payment 
settlements harm consumers. According to the FTC, these agreements are 
presumptively anticompetitive,34 costing consumers billions of dollars a 
year in higher prices.35 Both the FTC and the Antitrust Division of the 
Department of Justice have filed amicus briefs in multiple private 
 
monopolist, the brand company has the ability to control prices, which results in higher profits. But if 
the brand company continues the litigation and loses, the generic company can enter the market. 
Because generic drugs cost less, many consumers will switch to the generic drug, and the brand 
company will be forced to reduce its price to compete. As a result, losing the litigation would cost the 
brand company billions of dollars. 
 30. Carrier, supra note 17, at 39. When it delays entry by generic firms, the brand firm increases 
its monopoly profits. It then uses a portion of the profits to pay the generic firm more than it would 
have received through market entry. See Hemphill, supra note 17, at 1578 (concluding that the 180-day 
bounty ensures that a reverse payment settlement is an attractive option for both the brand and 
generic firms). 
 31. Hovenkamp et al., supra note 28, at 1755 (noting that it is generally accepted that the 180-day 
period of exclusive marketing provides the potential for collusive settlement agreements between 
brand firms and generic firms); see Hemphill, supra note 26, at 708. Hemphill argues that reverse 
payment settlements are encouraged by the fact that the generic firm retains the 180-day exclusive 
marketing period even if it settles. In his opinion, if the generic firm was required to give up the 180-
day period when it settled, that would reduce the harm of reverse payment settlements. 
 32. Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1074 (11th Cir. 2005). 
 33. See In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197 (3d Cir. 2012); Ark. Carpenters Health & 
Welfare Fund v. Bayer AG, 604 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 2010); In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust 
Litig., 544 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2008); In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3 187, 206–07 (2d 
Cir. 2006); Andrx Pharm., Inc. v. Elan Corp., 421 F.3d 1227 (11th Cir. 2005); Valley Drug Co. v. 
Geneva Pharm., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2003); In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896 
(6th Cir. 2003); Kroger Co. v. Sanofi-Aventis, No. 1:06-cv-00263-HJW, 2006 WL 2503664 (S.D. Ohio 
July 31, 2006); Biovail Corp. v. Mylan Labs, Inc., No. 1:01 CV66, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6726 
(N.D.W.Va. May 2, 2003); In re Buspirone Patent Litig., 185 F. Supp. 2d 363 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). 
 34. Statement of the Federal Trade Commission Chairman Jon Leibowitz on the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Third Circuit Ruling in the K-Dur 20 Matter, Fed. Trade Comm’n (July 16, 2012), 
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2012/07/kdur.shtm. 
 35. FTC Staff Report Finds 60 Percent Increase in Pharmaceutical Industry Deals, supra note 2. 
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lawsuits.36 According to a report from the Congressional Budget Office, 
eliminating these agreements would reduce federal government debt by 
$4.8 billion over ten years.37 And on four occasions, Congress has tried to 
pass legislation that would make these agreements illegal.38 
The majority of scholars agree that a presumption of illegality is 
appropriate for these agreements39 because they are anticompetitive and 
harm consumers.40 There are two reasons why courts should view these 
settlements as atypical patent settlements that have harmful effects on 
consumers. 
First, reverse payment settlements decrease competition. Because the 
180-day exclusivity period is not transferable, reverse payment settlements 
prevent future patent challenges.41 By removing all competitors, reverse 
payments force consumers to continue paying high prices.42 In contrast, if 
there is a patent settlement in an unregulated industry, competing firms 
will still challenge the patent because they can market their product 
immediately if they win.43 The patent holder has no incentive to pay for 
delay because the payment would not protect it from challenges from 
other competitors. Also, an ordinary patent case usually settles with a 
license agreement, which allows the infringing company to pay a royalty 
and sell its product.44 In sum, an ordinary patent case in an unregulated 
industry results in more competition, not less. 
 
 36. See, e.g., Brief for the United States, Ark. Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund, 604 F.3d 98 
(Nos. 05-2851-cv(L), 05-2852-cv(CON)). 
 37. Cong. Budget Office, Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate: S. 27 Preserve Access 
to Affordable Generics Act (2011). 
 38. See Protecting Consumer Access to Generic Drugs Act of 2012, H.R. 3995, 112th Cong. (2d 
Sess. 2012); America’s Affordable Health Choices Act of 2009, H.R. 3200, 111th Cong. (1st Sess. 
2009); Preserve Access to Affordable Generics Act, S. 369, 111th Cong. (1st Sess. 2009); Drug Price 
Competition Act of 2009, S. 1315, 111th Cong. (1st Sess. 2009). 
 39. See Carrier, supra note 17, at 38 (“[C]ourts should treat such settlements as presumptively 
illegal.”); Hemphill, supra note 26, at 708 (proposing that courts accord a presumption of illegality for 
agreements that contain a substantial payment); Hemphill, supra note 17, at 1561–62 (concluding that 
these settlements should be accorded a presumption of illegality); Hovenkamp et al., supra note 28, at 
1720–21 (arguing that reverse payments that exceed litigation costs should be presumptively illegal). 
 40. Herbert Hovenkamp, Patents, Property, and Competition Policy, 34 J. Corp. L. 1243, 1251–52 
(2009); see Carrier, supra note 17, at 75–76; Hemphill, supra note 26, at 703–05. 
 41. Michael A. Carrier, Solving the Drug Settlement Problem: The Legislative Approach, 
41 Rutgers L.J. 83, 84 (2009) (“[R]everse payment agreements . . . are not typical settlements. They 
are agreements that dispose of the validity and infringement challenges central to the Hatch-Waxman 
scheme.”). 
 42. Hemphill, supra note 26, at 704 (“[Reverse payment settlements are] bad . . . . A pay-for-delay 
settlement transfers wealth from consumers to drug makers in the form of continued high prices.”). 
 43. Carrier, supra note 17, at 61. Carrier notes that unlike pay-for-delay agreements, ordinary 
patent settlements do not prevent other competitors from challenging the patent. In ordinary patent 
cases, if a defendant settles and agrees not to challenge the patent, “many others often wait in the 
wings to do so.” Id. 
 44. Michael Carrier, Innovation for the 21st Century: A Response to Seven Critics, 61 Ala. L. Rev. 
597, 611 (2010); see Hovenkamp et al., supra note 28, at 1749–50. 
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Second, the payment size demonstrates that brand companies are 
purchasing a longer delay than their patents authorize.45 If no payment is 
made, the length of the delay is a product of the strength of the patent 
and, therefore, indicative of the strength of the parties’ litigation 
positions.46 Thus, the larger the payment size, the greater the deviation 
from the monopoly period allowed by the strength of the patent. The large 
payment size also suggests that the patent is invalid.47 If the brand 
company is likely to lose, it is more willing to pay for delay.48 In that 
situation, there is no benefit that outweighs the competitive harm to 
consumers.49 The enormous payments are even more disturbing when one 
considers the high success rate among generic companies. According to a 
recent FTC study, generic companies won seventy-three percent of cases 
between 1992 and 2000.50 
Interestingly, between 2004 and 2009, seventy percent of Hatch-
Waxman settlements did not contain reverse payments.51 This suggests 
that reverse payment settlements are not necessary to settle patent 
infringement cases in the pharmaceutical context. But if reverse 
payments are not required to settle these cases, then why would Bayer 
pay $398 million to settle the Cipro litigation?52 The answer is obvious.  
 
 45. See Carrier, supra note 44, at 612. Carrier argues that in most cases, payments that exceed the 
patent holder’s litigation costs are being used to buy a later generic entry than the patent itself can 
provide. The general view is that payments that do not exceed the brand company’s litigation costs do 
not raise a red flag. Id. See generally Hovenkamp et al., supra note 28, at 1758–60; Herbert 
Hovenkamp, Sensible Antitrust Rules for Pharmaceutical Competition, 39 U.S.F. L. Rev. 11, 25 (2004) 
(noting that even a plaintiff who is sure of success would be willing to pay less than its litigation costs 
to settle the case). 
 46. Hemphill, supra note 26, at 703–04 (arguing that when a brand company makes a payment 
instead of relying solely on the strength of its case, it secures a later date of entry—one that is not 
warranted by the patent alone). 
 47. Carrier, supra note 44, at 612 (arguing that paying generics more than they would have earned 
had they entered the market raises a red flag of potential invalidity). 
 48. Hovenkamp et al., supra note 28, at 1758 (“[T]he size of the expected exclusion payments are 
inversely related to the strength of the patentee’s case: the less likely the patentee is to win, the more it 
is willing to pay a generic to stay out of the market.”). 
 49. As Hovenkamp stated, “a larger payment suggests a more socially costly outcome—namely, 
preserving the exclusion power of the patent, at least vis-à-vis this particular defendant, even though 
the patent is likely to be invalid. The result is to deny the public the benefits of competition that it 
could otherwise obtain.” Hovenkamp, supra note 45, at 25. 
 50. See Fed. Trade Comm’n, Generic Drug Entry Prior to Patent Expiration: An FTC Study 
16 (2002); see also Paul M. Janicke & Lilan Ren, Who Wins Patent Infringement Cases?, 34 AIPLA 
Q.J. 1, 20 (2006) (noting that, according to a Federal Circuit survey, brand companies prevail in only 
thirty percent of cases). 
 51. See Fed. Trade Comm’n, Pay-for-Delay, supra note 3. 
 52. The Cipro settlement totaled $398.1 million and delayed all generic entry until the end of the 
patent term. In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323, 1329 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
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The next Part summarizes the reverse payment cases that were 
decided between 2003 and 2012 and analyzes the three approaches that 
have emerged from those cases. 
III.  A History of the Circuit Split 
A. The Cases 
1. In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litigation53 
Hoescht Marion Roussel, Inc. (“HMR”) sued Andrx Pharmaceuticals 
(“Andrx”) after Andrx filed an ANDA-IV for a generic version of 
Cardizem CD, which is used to treat angina and hypertension, and to 
prevent heart attacks and strokes.54 In response to the ANDA-IV, HMR 
filed a patent suit, triggering the thirty month waiting period for FDA 
approval.55 But when the FDA tentatively approved Andrx’s ANDA-IV 
(pending expiration of the thirty-month waiting period or a decision that 
the patent was not infringed), the parties formed an agreement.56 Under 
this agreement, Andrx agreed to delay marketing its generic version of 
Cardizem CD. In addition, Andrx agreed to hold onto its 180-day period 
of marketing exclusivity.57 In return, HMR agreed to pay Andrx 
$40 million per year from the time that Andrx received FDA approval. 
Furthermore, HMR agreed to pay an additional $100 million (less any 
interim payments) in the event that certain events transpired during the 
litigation.58 After the thirty-month stay expired, the FDA approved 
Andrx’s ANDA-IV. HMR started to make its $40 million payments to 
Andrx, and Andrx did not market its generic version of Cardizem CD.59 
About a year later, Andrx received FDA approval for a reformulated 
version of Cardizem CD.60 On the same day, the parties settled the 
infringement lawsuit and terminated the aforementioned “pay-for-delay” 
agreement.61 Shortly thereafter, Andrx started to market its generic 
version of Cardizem CD.62 At the time of the settlement, HMR had paid 
Andrx a total of $89.83 million.63 
About a month after the parties signed their initial, pay-for-delay 
agreement, purchasers of Cardizem CD filed complaints in various courts 
 
 53. 332 F.3d 896 (6th Cir. 2003). 
 54. Id. at 899, 901. 
 55. Id. at 902. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 903. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
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alleging violations of the federal antitrust laws and state antitrust and 
consumer protection statutes.64 The plaintiffs alleged that the agreement 
prevented Andrx from selling its generic drug when it received FDA 
approval and prevented other generic firms from entering the market 
due to Andrx’s postponement of the 180-day exclusive marketing 
period.65 The district court concluded that the agreement (pursuant to 
which Andrx was paid $40 million per year not to enter the market) was 
a per se illegal market allocation agreement, and it granted plaintiffs’ 
motion for partial summary judgment.66 Specifically, the court stated: 
There is simply no escaping the conclusion that the Agreement, all of 
its other conditions and provisions notwithstanding, was, at its core, a 
horizontal agreement to eliminate competition in the market for 
Cardizem CD throughout the entire United States, a classic example of 
a per se illegal restraint of trade.67 
Presently, the Sixth Circuit is the only circuit court to determine that a 
reverse payment agreement is per se illegal. However, in its opinion, the 
court noted that the agreement restrained generic firm Andrx from 
marketing other versions of Cardizem CD that were not covered by the 
patent litigation.68 As a result, many believe that the Sixth Circuit did not 
intend to find all reverse payment agreements to be per se illegal, but 
rather only those agreements that restrict competition beyond the scope of 
the patent.69 
2. Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC70 
Schering-Plough Corporation (“Schering”) manufactures K-Dur 20, a 
potassium chloride product, which is used to treat high blood pressure and 
congestive heart disease.71 In conjunction with K-Dur 20, Schering owns a 
formulation patent on the coating.72 Upsher-Smith Laboratories 
(“Upsher”) filed an ANDA-IV for its generic version of K-Dur 20, which 
is called Klor Con M20.73 In response, Schering filed a patent infringement 
 
 64. Id. at 903 n.7. 
 65. Id. at 904. 
 66. Id. at 905. 
 67. Id. at 908. 
 68. Id. at 908 n.13. 
 69. See In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323, 1335 (“[A]lthough the 
Sixth Circuit found a per se violation in In re Cardizem, the facts of that case are distinguishable from this 
case and from the other circuit court decisions. . . . [in part because] the agreement provided that the 
generic manufacturer would not market non-infringing versions of the generic drug. Thus, the agreement 
clearly had anticompetitive effects outside the exclusion zone of the patent.” (citations omitted)). 
 70. 402 F.3d 1056 (11th Cir. 2005). 
 71. Id. at 1058. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
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lawsuit.74 On the eve of trial, the parties entered into a settlement 
agreement.75 As part of the settlement, the parties agreed on an entry 
date for Upsher’s generic drug, and Schering agreed to license Niacor 
and five other products from Upsher for an initial royalty fee of 
$60 million.76 Around the same time, ESI Lederle, Inc. (“ESI”) filed an 
ANDA-IV for Micro-K 20, another generic version of K-Dur 20.77 
Schering sued ESI, and the parties settled.78 ESI agreed that it would 
enter the market three years before Schering’s patent expired.79 In 
return, Schering agreed to pay $5 million and an extra $10 million if ESI 
received FDA approval by a specified date.80 
About three years later, the FTC filed an administrative action 
against Schering, Upsher, and ESI, alleging that the settlement agreements 
violated the antitrust laws.81 The administrative law judge dismissed the 
complaint, finding that the settlements were lawful.82 The FTC staff 
appealed the decision to the full Commission, which reversed it.83 The 
pharmaceutical defendants then appealed to the Eleventh Circuit. 
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit applied what is now known as the 
exclusionary scope analysis. Citing to its decision in Valley Drug Co. v. 
Geneva Pharmaceuticals, Inc., the Eleventh Circuit examined: “(1) the 
scope of the exclusionary potential of the patent; (2) the extent to which 
the agreements exceed that scope; and (3) the resulting anticompetitive 
effects.”84 To apply this test, the court examined the language of the 
agreement and concluded that the language did not exceed the scope of 
the patent. The court did not examine the validity of the patent at issue. 
The judgment of the FTC was set aside.85 
According to 35 U.S.C. § 282, a “patent shall be presumed valid.”86 
The Eleventh Circuit relied on this presumption in finding that “Schering 
obtained the legal right to exclude Upsher and ESI from the market until 
they proved either that the ’743 patent was invalid or that their 
products . . . did not infringe Schering’s patent.”87 The court also believed 
that the exclusionary scope analysis reflected public policy:  
 
 74. Id. at 1059. 
 75. Id. at 1060. 
 76. Id. at 1059–60. 
 77. Id. at 1060. 
 78. Id. at 1060–61. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at 1061. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 1062. 
 84. Id. at 1066 (quoting Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm., 344 F.3d 1294, 1312 (11th Cir. 2003)). 
 85. Id. at 1076. 
 86. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2012). 
 87. Schering-Plough, 402 F.3d at 1066–67. 
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Given the costs of lawsuits to the parties, the public problems 
associated with overcrowded dockets, and the correlative public and 
private benefits of settlements, we fear and reject a rule of law that 
would automatically invalidate any agreement where a patent-holding 
pharmaceutical manufacturer settles an infringement case by 
negotiating the generic’s entry date, and, in an ancillary transaction, 
pays for other products licensed by the generic.88 
The court was concerned that a draconian rule would negatively impact 
settlement activity. 
3. In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litigation89 
Zeneca, Inc. (“Zeneca”) sued Barr Laboratories, Inc. (“Barr”) after 
Barr filed an ANDA-IV for a generic version of Tamoxifen, a breast 
cancer treatment drug.90 The district court declared that the patent was 
invalid, and Zeneca appealed.91 While the appeal was still pending, the 
parties settled.92 Under the terms of the settlement agreement, Barr 
received $21 million and a license to sell Zeneca’s Tamoxifen under the 
Barr label.93 Furthermore, Barr’s raw material supplier received 
$9.5 million up front in addition to $35.9 million over the next ten years.94 
In return, Barr agreed to refrain from marketing its generic version of 
Tamoxifen until Zeneca’s patent expired.95 
Consumer groups sued Zeneca and Barr, alleging that the 
settlement agreement violated the antitrust laws.96 The district court 
granted Zeneca and Barr’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, 
and the plaintiff consumers appealed.97 
On appeal, the Second Circuit applied the exclusionary scope 
analysis.98 The court analyzed the language of the agreement and 
concluded that any exclusionary effects were within the scope of the 
patent.99 Like the Eleventh Circuit, the Second Circuit did not examine 
the validity of the patent at issue.100 Rather, the court presumed that the 
patent was valid, even though it was found to be invalid by the district 
 
 88. Id. at 1076. 
 89. 466 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2005). 
 90. Id. at 190, 193. 
 91. Id. at 193. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 193–94. 
 94. Id. at 194. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 196–97. 
 97. Id. at 197. 
 98. Id. at 213. 
 99. Id. at 213–14. 
 100. Id. at 200. 
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court prior to Zeneca and Barr’s settlement.101 In reaching its decision, 
the court relied on the presumption of validity in 35 U.S.C. § 282.102 The 
court also emphasized the public interest in the settlement of complex 
and expensive litigation.103 
4. In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation 
(Cipro)104 
Bayer manufactures the antibiotic Cipro and owns the patent that 
covers its active ingredient.105 A few years after the patent issued, Barr 
filed an ANDA-IV for a generic version of Cipro, alleging that the 
relevant patent was invalid and unenforceable.106 Bayer sued Barr for 
infringement, and Barr entered into a litigation-funding agreement with 
Rugby, a subsidiary of Hoechst Marion Roussel. Before trial, the parties 
entered into a settlement in which the generic companies agreed not to 
challenge the validity and enforceability of the patent until it expired.107 
In return, Bayer agreed to pay Barr $49.1 million initially, in addition to 
quarterly payments, eventually totaling $398.1 million.108 
Direct and indirect purchasers of Cipro filed antitrust actions, 
claiming that the agreement between Bayer and the generic companies 
was an illegal market allocation.109 The district court denied plaintiffs’ 
motion for summary judgment and granted defendants’ motion for the 
same.110 Because the indirect purchasers added antitrust claims that are 
preempted by patent law, the case was bifurcated for appeal—the direct 
purchasers’ appeal was heard by the Second Circuit, and the indirect 
purchasers’ appeal was heard by the Federal Circuit.111 
On appeal, the Federal Circuit applied the exclusionary scope 
analysis. In affirming the lower court’s decision, the Federal Circuit 
found that it was within Bayer’s rights as the patent holder to exclude the 
defendants from profiting from its patented invention.112 Plaintiffs argued 
unsuccessfully that Bayer’s “right to exclude competition is not defined 
by the facial scope of the patent, but rather is limited to the right to 
exclude others from profiting from the patented invention.”113 
 
 101. Id. at 209 n.22. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 202. 
 104. 544 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 105. Id. at 1327–28. 
 106. Id. at 1328. 
 107. Id. at 1329. 
 108. Id. at 1329 n.5. 
 109. Id. at 1329. 
 110. Id. at 1330. 
 111. Ark. Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund v. Bayer AG, 604 F.3d 98, 103 n.10 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 112. Cipro, 544 F.3d at 1333. 
 113. Id. at 1332–33. 
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The court also noted the “long-standing policy in . . . favor of 
settlements.”114 According to the court, “[s]ettlement of patent claims by 
agreement between the parties—including exchange of consideration—
rather than by litigation is not precluded by the Sherman Act even though 
it may have some adverse effect on competition.”115 The court was not 
persuaded by plaintiffs’ argument that it should consider the public 
interest in removing invalid patents.116 Rather, the court concluded that, 
“in the absence of evidence of fraud before the PTO or sham litigation, 
the court need not consider the validity of the patent in the antitrust 
analysis of a settlement agreement involving a reverse payment.”117 
Like the Second and Eleventh Circuits, the Federal Circuit invoked 
the presumption of validity in support of its conclusion.118 Citing 
Tamoxifen, the court stated that a “settlement is not unlawful if it serves 
to protect that to which the patent holder is legally entitled—a monopoly 
over the manufacture and distribution of the patented invention.”119 
After losing before the Federal Circuit, the indirect purchaser 
plaintiffs petitioned the Supreme Court for review, but their petition for 
certiorari was denied.120 
5. Arkansas Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund v. Bayer AG121 
As was discussed above, the indirect purchasers’ appeal in Cipro 
was transferred to the Federal Circuit, but the direct purchasers’ appeal 
was heard by the Second Circuit. Following Tamoxifen, the Second 
Circuit applied the exclusionary scope analysis and determined that the 
language in the agreement did not exceed the scope of the patent.122 
In its analysis, the court explicitly declined to address the validity of 
the patent:  
The Tamoxifen majority urged against addressing the probability that a 
patent was invalid and deferred to a patent holder’s desire to settle 
patent challenges, concluding that a patent holder could reasonably 
decide to pay money, even more than a generic manufacturer would 
make on the market, to guarantee protection of its patent.123 
 
 114. Id. at 1333. 
 115. Id. (citing Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 163, 171 n.5 (1931)). 
 116. Id. at 1334. 
 117. Id. at 1336. 
 118. Id. at 1337. 
 119. Id. 
 120. See Ark. Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund v. Bayer AG, No. 08-1194, 129 S. Ct. 2828 (June 
22, 2009) (denying certiorari). 
 121. 604 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 122. Id. at 104–06. 
 123. Id. at 108 (quoting In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 446 F.3d 187, 210 (2d Cir. 2006)). 
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The court mentioned other policy considerations, but they were not 
addressed in the court’s final analysis because it ultimately decided that it 
was bound to follow Tamoxifen.124 However, the panel suggested that it 
might be willing to reconsider the standard in Tamoxifen and cited various 
reasons why the current case might be appropriate for reexamination by 
the full court.125 In concluding, the panel invited plaintiffs to petition for 
rehearing by the full court.126 Although plaintiffs complied with this 
request and petitioned for rehearing en banc, unexpectedly, their petition 
was denied.127 Subsequently, plaintiffs petitioned the Supreme Court for 
review, but their writ of certiorari was also denied.128 
6. In re K-Dur Antitrust Litigation129 
In this case, consumers of K-Dur 20 filed a lawsuit against Schering, 
Upsher, and ESI. The plaintiffs claimed that the companies’ settlement 
of patent litigation was a reverse payment agreement that violated the 
antitrust laws. This case challenged the same agreement that the FTC 
challenged in Schering-Plough.130 The district court utilized the 
exclusionary scope analysis and granted the pharmaceutical defendants’ 
motion to dismiss. On appeal, the Third Circuit rejected the exclusionary 
scope test, finding that it failed to subject reverse payment agreements to 
any antitrust scrutiny and that it undermined the policies of the Hatch-
Waxman Act.131 
The Third Circuit opted to create its own analysis, which it referred 
to as a “quick look rule of reason analysis.”132 This analysis was based in 
part on the approach espoused by the FTC in its amicus brief.133 Under this 
test, a reverse payment settlement is prima facie evidence of an 
unreasonable restraint of trade, incorporating the concept of presumptive 
illegality.134 After evidence of a reverse payment has been proffered, the 
prima facie case can be rebutted.135 The court provided two examples of 
how the prima facie case can be rebutted. First, the drug manufacturers 
can demonstrate that the payment was not for delay, but for another 
 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. at 110. 
 127. Ark. Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund v. Bayer AG, 625 F.3d 779, 779 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 128. La. Wholesale Drug Co. v. Bayer AG (2d Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1606 (2011) (No. 
10-762). 
 129. 686 F.3d 197 (3d Cir. 2012).  
 130. See Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056 (11th Cir. 2005). 
 131. In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 214. 
 132. Id. at 218. 
 133. See Brief of the Fed. Trade Comm’n as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellants and Urging 
Reversal at 22–28, In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d 197 (Nos. 10-2077, 10-2078, 10-2079); see also Carrier, supra 
note 17, at 76–78 (advocating a similar approach to that proposed by the FTC in its amicus brief). 
 134. In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 218. 
 135. Id. 
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reason.136 Second, defendants can demonstrate that the payment creates a 
procompetitive result that could not have been achieved absent the reverse 
payment, such as “a modest cash payment that enables a cash-starved 
generic manufacturer to avoid bankruptcy and begin manufacturing a 
generic drug.”137 
The Third Circuit reversed the decision of the district court and 
remanded the case so it could apply the aforementioned analysis.138 The 
pharmaceutical defendants petitioned the Supreme Court for review.139 
7. FTC v. Watson Pharmaceuticals, Inc.140 
Besins Healthcare developed AndroGel, a gel that treats low 
testosterone.141 Solvay Pharmaceuticals obtained a license to sell AndroGel 
in the United States. After it received FDA approval, Solvay obtained a 
patent.142 Watson Pharmaceuticals and Paddock Laboratories filed 
ANDA-IVs in May 2003.143 In response, Solvay filed patent infringement 
suits against both companies. Eventually, the defendants filed motions for 
summary judgment.144 While those motions were pending, the thirty 
month stay for FDA approval expired in January 2006.145 Faced with the 
possibility of losing $125 million a year in profits, Solvay settled with 
Watson and Paddock before the motions for summary judgment were 
decided. Watson and Paddock agreed not to market their generic 
versions of AndroGel until August 31, 2015.146 Solvay agreed to pay 
Paddock $10 million per year for six years, plus $2 million per year for 
back-up manufacturing assistance. Solvay also agreed to pay Watson 
between $19 and $30 million per year.147 
When this agreement was reported to the FTC pursuant to statutory 
requirements, the FTC filed an antitrust claim against Solvay, Watson, 
Par,148 and Paddock. The FTC argued that Solvay was not likely to prevail 
in the patent case because Watson and Paddock had strong evidence that 
their products did not infringe the patent and that the patent was invalid. 
As a result, the FTC argued, Solvay’s reverse payments extended a 
 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, FTC v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 787 (2012) (No. 12-265). 
 140. 677 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2012). 
 141. Id. at 1303–04.  
 142. Id. at 1304. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. at 1305. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Par entered into a litigation-sharing agreement with Paddock. Id. at 1304. 
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monopoly that is not authorized under the patent laws, unlawfully 
restraining competition.149 
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. 
The district court applied the exclusionary scope analysis and granted the 
motion.150 Relying on its decisions in Valley Drug and Schering-Plough, 
the Eleventh Circuit also applied the exclusionary scope analysis and 
affirmed the district court’s decision.151 Significantly, the Eleventh Circuit 
concluded that “neither the rule of reason nor the per se test is an 
appropriate way to analyze the antitrust implications of a reverse 
payment settlement.”152 The court opined that these traditional analyses 
were inappropriate because “one of the signatories to the settlement 
holds a patent, and a patent conveys a right to ‘cripple competition.’”153 
The court rejected the rule advocated by the FTC: “that an exclusion 
payment is unlawful if, viewing the situation objectively as of the time of 
the settlement, it is more likely than not that the patent would not have 
blocked generic entry earlier than the agreed-upon entry date.”154 
According to the court, the “FTC’s position equates a likely result (failure 
of an infringement claim) with an actual result, but it is simply not true that 
an infringement claim that is ‘likely’ to fail actually will fail.”155 
B. Analyzing the Three Approaches 
1. Per Se Illegality 
There is no escaping the fact that the Sixth Circuit’s per se illegal 
approach is over-inclusive. Concluding that a reverse payment settlement 
is illegal without considering validity or infringement ignores the 
accepted view that a patent is a legal monopoly that gives the patent 
holder the legal right to exclude competitors. If there is a valid patent 
and the competing product infringes that patent, the patent holder can 
pay its competitor to stay out of the market. 
2. The Exclusionary Scope Analysis 
In contrast to the Sixth Circuit’s approach, the exclusionary scope 
analysis accomplishes too little. In most cases, it results in a total absence 
of antitrust scrutiny. Appropriately criticized as a “rule of per se legality,” 
this analysis assumes that a patent has a scope without first determining if 
 
 149. Id. at 1306. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. at 1312. 
 152. Id. at 1309. 
 153. Id. at 1310 (quoting Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1066 (11th Cir. 2005)). 
 154. Id. at 1312. 
 155. Id. 
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the patent is valid.156 But if a patent is invalid, then there is no scope at 
all.157 
To justify this conclusion, the courts invoke the presumption of 
validity found in 35 U.S.C. § 282. But the presumption of validity is a 
procedural presumption that allocates the burden of proof between the 
parties. It is not substantive evidence of validity.158 Furthermore, it is clear 
from the statute that this presumption was intended to be rebuttable: “The 
burden of establishing invalidity of a patent or any claim thereof shall rest 
on the party asserting such invalidity.”159 
Also, in cases where only infringement is disputed, the exclusionary 
scope analysis creates a presumption of infringement that has no basis in 
the law. In patent law, the burden of proof is on the patent holder to 
prove infringement. There is no presumption of infringement. 
Because it fails to address validity and infringement, the exclusionary 
scope analysis ignores the very issues that determine whether an antitrust 
violation exists. The widespread use of the exclusionary scope analysis has 
resulted in an absence of antitrust scrutiny for reverse payment 
settlements. 
To understand the exclusionary scope analysis, one needs to 
examine the policies that motivate it. First, the courts emphasize that a 
patent gives the patent holder the right to exclude competitors, which 
negatively impacts competition but increases innovation. Second, the 
courts rely on the policy favoring settlement. These policies will be 
addressed in turn. 
a. A Patent’s Right to Exclude Should Be Considered 
Alongside the Public Interest in Removing Invalid Patents 
The courts are correct that a patent is an exception to the rule that 
competition is always better. If a patent is valid, the public benefits 
produced by innovation outweigh the harm to competition. Thus, when 
dealing with a valid patent, a court should uphold its right to exclude 
competitors. But what if the patent is invalid? In this situation, there is 
no benefit that outweighs the harm to competition. If the holder of an 
invalid patent excludes all competitors through a reverse payment 
settlement, the anticompetitive effects are not outweighed by any public 
benefit. As a result, when dealing with an antitrust challenge to a reverse 
payment settlement, courts should also consider the public interest in 
removing invalid patents. 
 
 156. See Hemphill, supra note 26, at 705–06 (“[Courts] have adopted a rule that verges on per se 
legality . . . .”). 
 157. Carrier, supra note 17, at 66 (“[I]f the patent is not valid, there is no scope at all.”). 
 158. See Carrier, supra note 41, at 86; see also Carrier, supra note 17, at 64. 
 159. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2012). 
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This policy has its roots in Supreme Court precedent. In Precision 
Instrument Manufacturing Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Machinery, the 
Supreme Court noted: 
The possession and assertion of patent rights are issues of great 
moment to the public. A patent by its very nature is affected with a 
public interest. . . . At the same time, a patent is an exception to the 
general rule against monopolies and to the right to access to a free and 
open market. The far reaching social and economic consequences of a 
patent, therefore, give the public a paramount interest in seeing that 
patent monopolies spring from backgrounds free from fraud or other 
inequitable conduct and that such monopolies are kept within their 
legitimate scope.160 
The public’s interest in removing invalid patents was also upheld in Lear, 
Inc. v. Adkins: “[F]ederal law requires that all ideas in general circulation 
be dedicated to the common good unless they are protected by a valid 
patent.”161 
It is clear that the public interest in removing invalid patents 
influenced the creation of the Hatch-Waxman Act. The purpose of the 
Hatch-Waxman Act was to increase the availability of low cost drugs by 
encouraging generic firms to challenge potentially invalid patents through 
litigation.162 When a generic company files an ANDA-IV, it initiates a 
process that was intended to end with a judicial decision regarding validity 
and infringement. If the generic firm prevails in the litigation, it can enter 
the market. The entry of competing drug makers increases competition 
and pushes down prices. 
The 180-day exclusive marketing period was created to encourage 
firms to challenge potentially invalid patents and enter prior to patent 
expiration. But in addition to encouraging litigation, it has provided the 
incentive for reverse payment settlements, which prevent future patent 
challenges. Through the Hatch-Waxman Act, Congress selected the 
amount of competition and innovation that serves the public interest.163 
Reverse payment settlements are private agreements that alter that 
balance, favoring more innovation over competition.164 
 
 160. Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach., 324 U.S. 806, 815–16 (1945) (citation 
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 161. Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 668 (1969). 
 162. See Carrier, supra note 17, at 60 (“[E]ven a cursory consideration of the statute underscores 
the importance of patent challenges.”); see also Hemphill, supra note 17, at 1614 (describing litigation 
as the instrument by which the Hatch-Waxman Act accomplishes its goals). 
 163. Hemphill, supra note 17, at 1614 (“[T]he [Hatch-Waxman] Act sets a particular balance 
between innovation and competition.”). 
 164. Id. Hemphill argues that the balance between innovation and competition that the Hatch-
Waxman Act creates for a specific drug is upset by a private settlement that favors more innovation 
over consumer access. 
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b. If These Settlements Actually Harm the Public, Then Why 
Rely on the Policy Favoring Settlement? 
Turning to the policy favoring settlement, it is clear that the courts’ 
reliance on this policy is completely misguided. The policy is premised on 
the idea that settlements benefit the public, reduce litigation expenses, 
and conserve judicial resources. Courts are increasingly promoting the 
settlement of patent cases, which produce large litigation expenses and 
are believed to consume a significant amount of judicial resources.165 But 
as a society, we should be wary of assuming that all settlements benefit the 
public interest.166 The courts consider the public interest when deciding a 
case.167 But when parties enter into a settlement, the court is removed from 
the process. The goal of the settling parties is to maximize their private 
interests.168 Reverse payment settlements do just that—they maximize 
the pharmaceutical companies’ profits at the expense of consumers. 
Because research and data demonstrate that reverse payment 
settlements harm consumers, the policy favoring settlement should not 
be considered when analyzing reverse payment settlements. 
Given the overwhelming evidence that reverse payments harm 
consumers, one should question whether the courts’ reliance on this 
policy is really motivated by a desire to protect the public interest. It 
appears that the courts are hiding behind this policy to avoid the complex 
and difficult issues that arise in patent cases.169 
3. Quick Look Rule of Reason 
The Third Circuit’s decision to reject the exclusionary scope analysis 
and create its own test is a positive step. In contrast to the courts that 
employed the exclusionary scope analysis, the Third Circuit refuses to 
hide behind the policy favoring settlement, observing that 
the judicial preference for settlement, while generally laudable, should 
not displace countervailing public policy objectives or, in this case, 
Congress’s determination—which is evident from the structure of the 
Hatch-Waxman Act and the statements in the legislative record—that 
 
 165. See Matthew Zisk, Mediation and Settlement of Patent Disputes in the Shadow of the Public 
Interest, 14 Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resol. 481, 483 (1999). 
 166. Owen Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 Yale L.J. 1073, 1075 (1984). Fiss disagrees with the position 
that settlement is always better than judgment. He argues that settlement should not be utilized “on a 
wholesale and indiscriminate basis.” Id. 
 167. Id. at 1085. 
 168. Id. (arguing that parties may settle in a manner that leaves justice undone). 
 169. Hovenkamp argues that the courts’ reluctance to examine the underlying merits of the patent 
claim is not due to the policy favoring settlement, but rather the difficulty inherent in determining 
patent validity and scope. Hovenkamp, supra note 40, at 1251. 
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litigated patent challenges are necessary to protect consumers from 
unjustified monopolies by name brand drug manufacturers.170  
The court further suggested that any analysis should also consider the 
public interest in removing invalid patents.171 
The Third Circuit’s analysis provides some antitrust scrutiny. In 
particular, their decision to treat reverse payment settlements as 
presumptively illegal was appropriate. But under the Third Circuit’s test, it 
is very easy for pharmaceutical companies to rebut the prima facie case. 
First, the court stated that the prima facie case can be rebutted by 
demonstrating that the payment was for a reason other than delay. But 
pharmaceutical companies are already hiding their exit payments in 
other transactions.172 That is what the drug companies were allegedly 
doing in In re K-Dur.173 
Second, the defendants can demonstrate that the payment creates a 
procompetitive result that could not otherwise have been achieved, such as 
“a modest cash payment that enables a cash-starved generic manufacturer 
to avoid bankruptcy and begin manufacturing a generic drug.”174 What 
qualifies as “cash-starved” is unclear. This phrase is sufficiently broad that 
most generic companies could fall into this category. Also, at what point 
does a company decide to file for bankruptcy? And how do we define a 
“modest cash payment”? 
Although the Third Circuit suggested that the public interest in 
removing invalid patents should be a factor in the analysis, in the end, its 
quick look rule of reason analysis does not examine validity or 
infringement at all. Like the courts that have employed the exclusionary 
scope analysis, the Third Circuit has failed to consider the issues that 
determine whether an antitrust violation has occurred. 
If the patent is valid and infringed, then the brand company can rely 
on the patent to exclude competition, and the reverse payment settlement 
is not considered a market allocation agreement.175 But if the patent is 
invalid or not infringed, then the agreement is a market allocation, which is 
 
 170. In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 217 (3d Cir. 2012). 
 171. Id. at 215–16. 
 172. See Carrier, supra note 41, at 93. Carrier notes that the payments from brand firms to generic 
firms are often hidden in other transactions. For example, instead of giving the generic firm a simple 
cash payment for delay, the brand companies are paying generics for IP licenses, products and/or raw 
materials, and advertising assistance. Id. 
 173. Schering (the brand manufacturer) promised to pay Upsher $60 million for three years to 
license Niacor-SR. Shering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1060 (11th Cir. 2005). After the 
settlement agreement was signed and the board ratified the acquisition of the license, plans to make 
and market Niacor-SR were abandoned. Id. The antitrust plaintiffs argued that the license agreement 
payment was in fact compensation to Upsher in return for its agreement not to enter the market. Id. at 
1068. 
 174. In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 218. 
 175. Carrier, supra note 41, at 91. 
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per se illegal.176 If an agreement is per se illegal, the defendant is not 
entitled to argue that there is a procompetitive justification.177 This rebuttal 
option is only available for agreements that are reviewed under the rule of 
reason. The Third Circuit’s analysis incorrectly provides rule of reason 
treatment for agreements that could very well be per se illegal market 
allocation agreements. But we will only know if these agreements are per 
se illegal if we first decide the issues of validity and infringement. As a 
result, to rebut the presumption of illegality, defendants must demonstrate 
that the patent is valid and infringed. 
IV.  The Solution: An Analysis Based on the Guiding Principles 
of TRINKO 
As the Eleventh Circuit noted in Schering-Plough, the “general 
policy of the law is to favor the settlement of litigation, and the policy 
extends to the settlement of patent infringement suits.”178 Furthermore, 
settlements in patent infringement suits are not precluded by the 
antitrust laws.179 Because settlement of patent litigation is generally 
favored, and the antitrust laws do not preclude such settlements, under 
normal circumstances, courts should consider the policy favoring 
settlement when analyzing antitrust challenges to patent litigation 
settlements. But we are not dealing with ordinary circumstances, and we 
are not dealing with ordinary patent settlements. 
In December 2012, the Supreme Court granted the petition for 
certiorari in Watson Pharmaceuticals.180 Before the Court are the three 
analyses discussed above. This Article argues that the Supreme Court’s 
decision should be guided by the principles in Verizon Communications 
v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko. Based on these principles, it is clear 
that all three approaches should be rejected. 
Trinko involved an antitrust challenge brought by customers of 
AT&T against Verizon Communications Inc.181 Pursuant to the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996, incumbent local exchange carriers, such 
as Verizon, were required to share their networks with competitors.182 
According to the complaint, Verizon failed to fill its rivals’ customer 
 
 176. See Palmer v. BRG of Ga., Inc., 498 U.S. 46 (1990); United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 
405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972); see also Carrier, supra note 17, at 72. Carrier notes that if a patent is invalid 
or not infringed, there is no legitimate justification for delaying competition, and the reverse payment 
agreement is a cover for market allocation. 
 177. Topco, 405 U.S. at 608. 
 178. Schering-Plough, 402 F.3d at 1072. 
 179. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 163, 171 (1931). 
 180. FTC v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 787 (2012). 
 181. Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 404 (2004). 
 182. Id. at 401. 
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service orders to discourage customers from using its rivals’ services.183 
Plaintiffs argued that this behavior constituted a refusal to deal in 
violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act, which forbids monopolies or 
attempts to monopolize.184 
To decide whether an antitrust violation existed, the Court first 
determined “what effect (if any) the 1996 Act ha[d] upon the application 
of traditional antitrust principles.”185 The Court further elaborated that 
antitrust analysis “must always be attuned to the particular structure and 
circumstances of the industry at issue. Part of that attention to economic 
context is an awareness of the significance of regulation.”186 The Court 
added that antitrust analysis “must sensitively recognize and reflect the 
distinctive economic and legal setting of the regulated industry to which 
it applies.”187 This last statement is a quote from Town of Concord v. 
Boston Edison Co., a First Circuit opinion that was written by then Chief 
Judge Breyer.188 
The Supreme Court’s approach in Trinko is based in part on Boston 
Edison.189 The latter involved a claim brought by municipal distributors 
of electricity against a fully integrated investor-owned utility, whose rates 
are regulated by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.190 The 
municipal distributors alleged that the defendant engaged in a price 
squeeze in violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act.191 The court held 
that this type of price squeeze would not ordinarily violate the Sherman 
Act because the defendant’s prices were regulated at both levels of 
production.192 The court further explained: “[I]n light of regulatory rules, 
constraints, and practices, the price squeeze at issue here is not ordinarily 
exclusionary, and, for that reason, it does not violate the Sherman 
Act.”193 The court reached its conclusion by “(1) analyzing the ordinary 
price squeeze, (2) comparing it to the ‘regulatory’ price squeeze, and 
(3) noting that regulation makes a critical difference in terms of antitrust 
harms, benefits, and administrative considerations.”194 Adopting a portion 
of this analysis and applying it to the telecommunications industry, the 
Trinko court concluded that the regulatory framework demonstrated 
 
 183. Id. at 404. 
 184. Id. at 407. 
 185. Id. at 405. 
 186. Id. at 411. 
 187. Id. (quoting Concord v. Boston Edison Co., 915 F.2d 17, 22 (1st Cir. 1990)). 
 188. Boston Edison, 915 F.2d at 22. 
 189. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 411–12 (citing Boston Edison, 915 F.2d 17). 
 190. Boston Edison, 915 F.2d at 20–21. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. at 22. 
 193. Id.  
 194. Id. at 23. 
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“how, in certain circumstances, ‘regulation significantly diminishes the 
likelihood of major antitrust harm.’”195 
Applying the foregoing analysis to reverse payment settlements 
results in a different conclusion. The circuit courts that utilize the 
exclusionary scope analysis are arguably stuck in part one of the Boston 
Edison analysis. They treat reverse payment settlements as ordinary 
patent settlements in an unregulated industry. But according to Trinko, 
in conducting their antitrust analysis, the courts need to consider “the 
particular structure and circumstances of the industry at issue.” They 
must be aware of “the significance of regulation.” In other words, they 
need to consider the particular circumstances of the pharmaceutical 
industry and how the Hatch-Waxman Act affects competition in that 
industry. 
Under the framework laid out in Trinko and Boston Edison, we 
should first compare the ordinary patent settlement to the Hatch-Waxman 
reverse payment settlement. When settling a patent claim in an 
unregulated industry, the alleged infringer pays a royalty fee to continue 
selling its product. In other words, patent settlements in unregulated 
industries result in more competition, not less competition. In contrast, in 
the Hatch-Waxman context, when the parties settle and the brand 
company pays the generic company to delay its entry, it precludes all 
other generics from entering the market.  
Next, we should consider whether the Hatch-Waxman Act makes a 
significant difference with respect to antitrust harms and benefits. Through 
the Hatch-Waxman Act, Congress sought to promote competition by 
encouraging patent challenges. It tried to promote these challenges by 
offering a 180-day exclusive marketing period. But the Hatch-Waxman 
Act is malfunctioning. The 180-day exclusivity period has encouraged the 
formation of reverse payment settlements, which harm consumers. Given 
the size of the payments and the high success rate of generic companies, 
it appears that reverse payment settlements are extending patents that 
are invalid and/or not infringed. As a result, the regulatory framework of 
the Hatch-Waxman Act is significantly increasing the likelihood of 
competitive harm. A reverse payment settlement in the pharmaceutical 
industry will normally constitute a market allocation agreement. 
In reaching its decision in Watson Pharmaceuticals, the Eleventh 
Circuit relied on the presumption of validity and the policy favoring 
settlement. The exclusionary scope analysis is a perfect blend of these 
two principles. Thus, this test may be appropriate for ordinary patent 
 
 195. Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 412 (2004) (quoting 
Boston Edison, 915 F.2d at 25). 
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settlements in an unregulated industry. But it is the wrong test for 
reverse payment settlements in the pharmaceutical industry. 
Because the regulatory structure of the Hatch-Waxman Act 
significantly increases the likelihood of antitrust harm, the general 
principal that courts should encourage settlement should not be a factor at 
all when analyzing reverse payment settlements. Because these settlements 
are more likely to extend patents that are invalid, the courts should focus 
on the public interest in removing invalid patents when creating their 
antitrust analysis. The presumption of illegality, which is utilized in In re 
K-Dur, is insufficient to uphold this public interest. Rather, the courts 
must decide the merits of the underlying patent claim.196 
Other commentators have also advocated an industry-specific 
approach to reverse payment settlements. For example, in an article they 
co-authored, Hovenkamp, Janis, and Lemley voiced support for such an 
approach.197 Relying in part on Trinko, Carrier has also advocated an 
industry-specific approach, arguing that the language of the Hatch-
Waxman Act demonstrates the secondary relevance of the settlement-
related policies on which the courts have focused their analysis.198 I agree 
that the courts are wrong to focus on the policy favoring settlement in 
analyzing these settlements. But I think the error is clear from the effect 
that the Hatch-Waxman Act has on competition, not from the language 
of the Act itself. The courts did not err by failing to consider the policies 
advanced in the Act. The error is in their failure to recognize that the 
regulatory framework of the Act is hurting competition, and to tailor 
their antitrust analysis accordingly. 
The aforementioned scholars do not support a full analysis on the 
merits.199 It is easy to understand why. Patent litigation is complex and 
time consuming, and the courts are busy. But let us not forget that we are 
dealing with a regulatory regime that significantly increases the 
likelihood of major antitrust harm and provides absolutely no antitrust 
scrutiny. As the Supreme Court noted in Trinko, where there “‘is 
nothing built into the regulatory scheme which performs the antitrust 
function,’ the benefits of antitrust are worth its sometimes considerable 
disadvantages.”200 In this context, the benefits to be gained are better 
health, freedom from pain, and in some cases, the chance to live. 
 
 196. Specifically, the courts must decide the issues of validity and infringement. 
 197. Hovenkamp et al., supra note 28, at 1736–39. 
 198. Carrier, supra note 17, at 69. 
 199. Id. at 73; Hovenkamp et al., supra note 28, at 1759–61. 
 200. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 412 (citation omitted). 
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Conclusion 
This Article has argued that the Supreme Court’s decision in Watson 
Pharmaceuticals should be guided by the principles in Trinko. During the 
last ten years, the circuit courts have developed three different approaches 
to analyzing reverse payment settlements. Unfortunately, none of these 
approaches fully complies with Trinko’s directive to consider the unique 
circumstances of the industry at issue. The Sixth Circuit’s approach 
completely ignores the fact that these settlements involve a patent. The 
exclusionary scope analysis relies on the presumption of validity and the 
policy favoring settlement even though these settlements are more likely 
to involve an invalid patent, and have been shown to harm consumers. 
Lastly, the Third Circuit approach applies a quick look rule of reason 
analysis to agreements that may be per se illegal market allocation 
agreements. 
The Hatch-Waxman Act itself has provided the foundation for 
reverse payment settlements. These settlements do not serve the public 
interest—they benefit the pharmaceutical companies at the expense of 
consumers. Based on the industry-specific approach mandated in Trinko, 
the Court should conclude that the general policy favoring settlement 
should not be a factor in this antitrust analysis and that the courts should 
decide the merits of the underlying patent claim. 
